

Introduction

This policy applies to clients who have specifically authorised Martin Currie to vote proxies in the investment management agreement (IMA) or other written instrument or who have, without specifically authorising MC to vote proxies, granted general investment discretion and sets out how we approach voting proxies for these clients.

We recognise that we have a duty to act in the best interests of our clients. To that end, our Proxy Voting Policy is designed to enhance shareholders' long-term economic interests. All our voting decisions are made in-house and are undertaken in accordance with our Global Corporate Governance Principles and in line with our clients' best interests. Proxy voting is integral to stewardship and as such we will, in most cases, routinely inform management of our investee companies when we are voting against them on material matters and provide our rationale.

Our policy is updated at least annually, taking into account emerging issues and trends, the evolution of market standards, and regulatory changes. The policy considers market-specific recommended best practices, transparency, and disclosure when addressing issues such as board structure, director accountability, corporate governance standards, executive compensation, shareholder rights, corporate transactions, and social/environmental issues.

The framework for making these decisions is set out in our Global Corporate Governance Principles.

As responsible stewards of our customers' capital, the fundamental tenet of our Global Corporate Governance Principles is to protect and enhance the economic interests of our clients. These principles are focused around corporate governance and the role of board directors in promoting corporate success, thereby creating sustainable value for shareholders while having regard to other stakeholders, both internal and external.

We believe that Sustainability or Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) factors create risks and opportunities for companies and that these should be managed appropriately. In particular, we believe that good governance of the companies in which we invest is an essential part of creating shareholder value and delivering investment performance for our clients.

We have adopted the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) Global Governance Principles, which set out a primary standard for well-governed companies that is widely applicable, irrespective of national legislative frameworks or listing rules. We also reference the Principles of Corporate Governance developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which are intended to help policymakers evaluate and improve the international frameworks for corporate governance. Differences in national market regulation mean that a single set of detailed guidelines is unlikely to be appropriate for all the countries in which we invest. Where local corporate governance codes are consistent with our overall principles we will adopt these. At a minimum we would expect companies to comply with the accepted corporate governance standard in their domestic market or to explain why doing so is not in the interest of (minority) shareholders.

This document should also be read alongside our Global Corporate Governance Principles and our stewardship statement which articulates how we discharge our stewardship duties for our clients.

This policy has been drafted in accordance with the Financial Reporting Council's Stewardship Code, which Martin Currie endorses. It is also intended to comply with Rule 206(4)-6 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. This policy sets forth the procedures of Martin Currie Investment Management Limited and Martin Currie Inc, (together 'Martin Currie') for voting proxies for clients, including investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended, except



where such clients require different standards to the voting of proxies to be applied on their behalf.

We believe the ICGN principles provide a strong and concise framework for determining the minimum corporate governance standards we should expect from the companies in which we invest. We also provide more detail on these in our Martin Currie Global Corporate Governance Principles.

We recognise that the circumstances under which companies operate vary considerably and as such we take into account the specific circumstances of each company when assessing how to approach corporate governance.

Scope and principles

This policy covers:

- ✓ The guiding principles on which we base our proxy voting decisions
- ✓ How we carry out proxy voting and exercise voting rights in the best interests of our clients
- ✓ How we report to our clients

The guiding principles for how we vote for our clients are the Martin Currie Global Corporate Governance Principles. These high level principles are set out below:

Principle 1: Board role and responsibilities

The board should act on an informed basis and in the best long-term interests of the company with good faith, care and diligence, for the benefit of shareholders, while having regard to relevant stakeholders, including creditors.

Principle 2: Leadership and independence

Board leadership calls for clarity and balance in board and executive roles and an integrity of process to protect the interests of minority investors and promote success of the company as a whole.

Principle 3: Composition and appointment

There should be a sufficient mix of directors with relevant knowledge, independence, competence, industry experience and diversity of perspectives to generate effective challenge, discussion and objective decision-making.

Principle 4: Corporate culture

The board should adopt high standards of business ethics, ensuring that its vision, mission and objectives are sound and demonstrative of its values. Codes of ethical conduct should be effectively communicated and integrated into the company's strategy and operations, including risk management systems and remuneration structures.

Principle 5: Risk oversight

The board should proactively oversee, review and approve the approach to risk management regularly or with any significant business change and satisfy itself that the approach is functioning effectively.

Principle 6: Remuneration

Remuneration should be designed to effectively align the interests of the CEO and executive officers with those of the company and its shareholders to help ensure long-term performance and sustainable value creation. The board should also ensure that aggregate remuneration is appropriately balanced with the needs to pay dividends to shareholders and retain capital for future investment.



Principle 7: Reporting and audit

Boards should oversee timely and high quality company disclosures for investors and other stakeholders relating to financial statements, strategic and operational performance, corporate governance and material environmental and social factors. A robust audit practice is critical for necessary quality standards.

Principle 8: Shareholder rights

Rights of all shareholders should be equal and must be protected. Fundamental to this protection is ensuring that shareholder voting rights are directly linked to the shareholder's economic stake, and that minority shareholders have voting rights on key decisions or transactions which affect their interest in the company.

Voting guidelines

Differences in national market regulation and corporate governance codes mean that a single set of detailed guidelines is unlikely to be appropriate for all the markets in which we invest. We summarise below the areas that we will most commonly focus on when forming a view on how to cast the proxies for our clients.

Director elections

In deciding how to vote on director elections we will consider, amongst other things:

- The composition of the board including skills and experience and whether the CEO/Chairman positions are held by one individual.
- Whether the proportion of independent directors on the board is appropriate - The board of a widely-held company should comprise a majority of independent non-executive directors. Controlled companies should have a majority of independent non-executive directors, and at least three (or one-third) independent directors, on the board.
- Director attendance at board/committee meetings – where it is less than 75% we would expect this to be explained.
- The number and nature of board appointments and individual holds – the tolerance will be lower where one of these is a CEO position.
- Unnecessary bundling of director elections.
- The composition of any committees and the appropriateness of their membership – for example whether the audit committee has recent and relevant financial experience.
- The appropriateness of the decisions made e.g. on remuneration.
- The quality, transparency and timing of reporting.
- Any egregious actions – e.g. material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight or fiduciary responsibilities, independence classification.

Remuneration

Where remuneration is put to a shareholder vote we will consider the extent to which it is aligned with our overall principles on remuneration, namely:

- Remuneration should be aligned to long-term success and the desired corporate culture of the organisation.
- Remuneration schemes for both executives and non-executives should ensure that rewards reflect long-term returns to shareholders.
- Disclosure associated with remuneration policies should be timely, clear and understandable for both investors and executives.



- Remuneration levels should not be higher than is necessary to attract and retain the individuals required to achieve the business strategy.
- Executive management and non-executive directors should make a material long-term investment in shares of the businesses they manage or oversee safeguards put in place to ensure alignment of interest with shareholders.
- The remuneration committee should, ideally, comprise entirely independent non-executive directors or supervisory board members.
- The remuneration committee should use the discretion provided to it by shareholders to ensure that awards properly reflect business performance.
- Non-Executive Director remuneration should consist solely of a cash retainer and equity-based remuneration subject to adequate safeguards being in place.

Capital Structure

Companies will commonly make requests to shareholders to approve changes to the capital structure of the business including share issuance, share repurchases, and takeover defence schemes. When considering these requests, we will take the circumstances of each company into account and, amongst other things, the following:

- The voting structure and in particular where this varies from one-share-one vote. We will normally vote against requests for the creation or continuation of dual-class capital structures, increased authorisation of classes of shares with superior voting rights or the creation of new or additional super voting shares.
- The potential for dilution – in markets where pre-emption rights apply to share issuance in general any routine authority to disapply pre-emption rights should not exceed 10 percent of ordinary share capital in any one year.
- Where there is a general authority to issue equity consideration will be given to other shareholder rights – for example the ability of shareholders to vote on significant transactions.
- Share buy-backs – where a request is made to authorise a share buy-back the time period this should be renewed annually and limited to no more than 15% of shares outstanding. Companies should have a clear policy on how they approach share buy-backs and should disclose in their next Annual Report the justification for any own share purchases made in the previous year.
- Take-over defence schemes – these will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis but are discouraged.

Shareholder proposals

Shareholder proposals can cover a wide range of topics and as such we will review each on its own merits. These will frequently focus on environmental and social issues as well as governance issues. We expect companies to manage effectively environmental, social and ethical factors that are relevant to their business, with a view to enhancing long-term sustainability and that companies should clearly define board and senior management responsibilities for environmental, social and ethical issues.

We vote on shareholder proposals on a pragmatic basis taking into account the context of the company concerned and any actions the company is already taking to address the concerns raised. We also expect boards to address issues raised where there is significant support for a shareholder proposal.



External research and proxy advisor

ISS is our proxy voting advisor and provides voting recommendations for Martin Currie in accordance with their own policy which is closely aligned with our internal policy. In addition, we use the services of Ownership Matters a specialist governance advisor. As appropriate, they engage with public issuers, shareholders, activists, and other stakeholders to seek additional information and to gain insight and context in order to provide informed vote recommendations. Martin Currie's starting point is to act in the best interests of our clients. Our voting decisions are informed by both our own internal work and that of our proxy advisor and specialist governance advisor. We assess voting matters on a case-by-case basis, taking into account a company's circumstances but are guided by our over-arching principles on good corporate governance. The assessment is carried out by the member of the investment team with responsibility for the stock in conjunction with the Head of Stewardship and ESG. We recognise that regulatory frameworks vary across markets and that corporate governance practices vary internationally. Where the recommendations of our advisors, both for and against proposals, are supported by our guidelines and our internal research we will generally vote in accordance with these recommendations.

Conflicts of Interest

Martin Currie recognises that there is a potential conflict of interest when we vote for a proxy solicited by a company with which we, or our portfolio managers, have a material business or personal relationship. In this context, the member of the investment team has a duty to disclose any potential, actual or apparent material conflict of interest relating to a proxy vote. Generally, a conflict is unlikely to arise if the vote is in accordance with our guidelines and that of our proxy advisor. However, if a member of the investment team wishes to vote contrary to the guidelines in relation to a company with which we have any material business or personal relationship, the matter must be referred to the Investment Team Leaders for independent consideration. We would consider a potential conflict of interest to exist where Martin Currie or relevant staff has a material personal or business relationship with the proponent, issuer or other relevant participants in the proxy proposal.

In the event that a portfolio manager is materially conflicted they are obliged to disclose the conflict of interest and provide their justification for voting contrary to the guidelines to the Investment Executive for independent consideration. The Investment Team Leaders are required to provide approval before the vote can be carried out. If the Investment Team Leaders are unable to approve the vote one of the following courses of action will be taken:

- vote such proxy according to the specific recommendation of our proxy advisor
- abstain
- request that the client votes such proxy

In the event that Martin Currie is materially conflicted, the firm will:

- vote such proxy according to the specific recommendation of our proxy advisor
- abstain
- request that the client votes such proxy

The compliance team will also be informed of all instances where a conflict of interest arises in order for them to carry out an oversight role.

The portfolio services team, as part of its annual due diligence, reviews the processes and controls adopted by our proxy advisor to manage potential material conflicts of interest it may face when performing the responsibilities delegated to it by the client.



Share blocking

Proxy voting in certain countries requires 'share blocking'. That is, shareholders wishing to vote their proxies must deposit their shares shortly before the date of the meeting (usually one week) with a designated depository. During this blocking period, shares that will be voted at the meeting cannot be sold until the meeting has taken place and the shares are returned to the shareholders' custodian banks.

Martin Currie has determined that the value of exercising the vote does not usually outweigh the detriment of not being able to transact in the shares during this period. Accordingly, if share blocking is required, we are likely to abstain from voting those shares.

Stock lending

Where we are aware that securities are on loan and if we judge a vote to be material, we may advise the relevant clients recall that stock in order to cast a proxy vote. In circumstances where it is not possible or practical to assess the materiality or where it is not possible to recall the security (e.g. where the events subject to voting are not communicated by the company in sufficient time) no votes will be cast. Martin Currie may utilise third party service providers to assist it in identifying and evaluating whether an event is material, and to assist it in recalling loaned securities for proxy voting purposes.

Proxy voting records

A copy of Martin Currie's Proxy Voting Policy and Procedures is available upon request. Clients may also obtain information on how Martin Currie voted with respect to their proxies by contacting our client services team at Martin Currie Investment Management Ltd, Saltire Court, 20 Castle Terrace, Edinburgh, Scotland, EH1 2ES, tel. 44 (0) 131 229 5252, fax 44 (0) 131 222 2532, email clientservicesteam@martincurrie.com.

Martin Currie has a specific record-keeping policy which describes in greater detail the record-keeping processes as apply to proxy voting.

Martin Currie is a signatory to the UK Stewardship Code ('the Code'). The Code aims to enhance the quality of engagement between institutional investors and companies to help improve long-term returns to shareholders and the efficient exercise of governance responsibilities by setting out good practice on engagement with investee companies. In accordance with the provisions of the Code and our Corporate Governance policy, cumulative proxy voting records are published quarterly on our website. This disclosure does not contain voting records for individual clients. Specific voting records for each client are available to those clients at any time upon request.

Martin Currie Investment Management Ltd, registered in Scotland (no 66107). Martin Currie Inc, registered in Scotland (no BR2575). Both companies are authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. Martin Currie Investment Management Limited, Saltire Court, 20 Castle Terrace, Edinburgh EH1 2ES, Tel: 44 (0) 131 229 5252 Fax: 44 (0) 131 228 5959, www.martincurrie.com. Martin Currie Inc, New York Times Building, 620 Eighth Avenue, 49th Floor, New York, NY 10018. Please note that calls to the above number may be recorded.